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Subgame Consistent Cooperation

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Strategic behavior in the human and social world has been increasingly recognized in theory and practice. It is well known that non-cooperative behavior could lead to suboptimal or even highly undesirable outcomes. Cooperation suggests the possibility of obtaining socially optimal solutions and the calls for cooperation are prevalent in real-life problems. Dynamic cooperation cannot be sustainable if there is no guarantee that the agreed upon optimality principle at the beginning is maintained throughout the cooperation duration. It is due to the lack of this kind of guarantees that cooperative schemes fail to last till its end or even fail to get started. The property of subgame consistency in cooperative dynamic games and the corresponding solution mechanism resolve this “classic” problem in game theory.

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Detail Information

Series Title

Theory and Decision Library C

Call Number

-

Publisher

Cham : Springer., 2016

Collation

XIV, 520

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

978-981-10-1545-8

Classification

NONE

Content Type

text

Media Type

computer

Carrier Type

online resource

Edition

-

Subject(s)

Mathematics and Statistics

Specific Detail Info

-

Statement of Responsibility

David W.K. Yeung, Leon A. Petrosyan

Other Information

Cataloger

Jemadi

Source

https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/978-981-10-1545-8.pdf?pdf=button

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