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Naturalizing the mind

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Naturalizing the Mind skillfully develops a representational theory of the qualitative, the phenomenal, the what-it-is-like aspects of the mind that have defied traditional forms of naturalism. Central to Dretske's approach is the claim that the phenomenal aspects of perceptual experiences are one and the same as external, real-world properties that experience represents objects as having. Combined with an evolutionary account of sensory representation, the result is a completely naturalistic account of phenomenal consciousness. Dretske's theory of naturalistic representationalism is perhaps the only approach to the study of consciousness that can satisfactorily pin down the slippery first-person aspect of our sensory and affective life. It distinguishes, in wholly naturalistic terms, between what we experience (reality) and how we experience it (appearance). The theory establishes a framework within which subjectivity can be studied objectively, explains the peculiar authority we enjoy about our own mental states, and provides a biologically plausible answer to questions about the function or purpose of consciousness.OCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.

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Series Title

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Call Number

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Publisher

Cambridge, Mass. : : MIT Press,., 1995.

Collation

1 online resource (xvi, 208 pages).

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

9780262271974

Classification

NONE

Content Type

text

Media Type

computer

Carrier Type

online resource

Edition

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Subject(s)

Philosophy of mind.

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

Fred Dretske.

Other Information

Cataloger

Kholif Basri

Source

https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/4872.001.0001

Validator

Kholif Basri

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