Text

Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content

---

Hutto and Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition which holds that some kinds of minds - basic minds - are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. It opposes the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. The authors defend the counter-thesis that there can be intentionality and phenomenal experience without content, and demonstrate the advantages of their approach for thinking about scaffolded minds and consciousness.OCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.

---

Availability

No copy data

Detail Information

Series Title

-

Call Number

-

Publisher

Cambridge, Mass. : : MIT Press Direct., 2013

Collation

1 online resource

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

0262312174

Classification

NONE

Content Type

text

Media Type

computer

Carrier Type

online resource

Edition

-

Subject(s)

cognition
Philosophy and cognitive science.
Philosophy of mind.
Cognitive science.
Content (Psychology)

Specific Detail Info

-

Statement of Responsibility

Daniel D. Hutto and Erik Myin.

Other Information

Cataloger

reva

Source

-

Validator

-

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9780262018548.001.0001

Journal Volume

-

Journal Issue

-

Subtitle

-

Parallel Title

-

Other version/related

File Attachment

Comments

---

You must be logged in to post a comment