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Cognitive pluralism

Horst, Steven W., - Personal Name;

An argument that we understand the world through many special-purpose mental models of different content domains, and an exploration of the philosophical implications. Philosophers have traditionally assumed that the basic units of knowledge and understanding are concepts, beliefs, and argumentative inferences. In Cognitive Pluralism, Steven Horst proposes that another sort of unit--a mental model of a content domain--is the fundamental unit of understanding. He argues that understanding comes not in word-sized concepts, sentence-sized beliefs, or argument-sized reasoning but in the form of idealized models and in domain-sized chunks. He argues further that this idea of "cognitive pluralism"--The claim that we understand the world through many such models of a variety of content domains--sheds light on a number of problems in philosophy. Horst first presents the "standard view" of cognitive architecture assumed in mainstream epistemology, semantics, truth theory, and theory of reasoning. He then explains the notion of a mental model as an internal surrogate that mirrors features of its target domain, and puts it in the context of ideas in psychology, philosophy of science, artificial intelligence, and theoretical cognitive science. Finally, he argues that the cognitive pluralist view not only helps to explain puzzling disunities of knowledge but also raises doubts about the feasibility of attempts to "unify" the sciences; presents a model-based account of intuitive judgments; and contends that cognitive pluralism favors a reliabilist epistemology and a "molecularist" semantics. Horst suggests that cognitive pluralism allows us to view rival epistemological and semantic theories not as direct competitors but as complementary accounts, each an idealized model of different dimensions of evaluation.OCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.


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Detail Information
Series Title
-
Call Number
-
Publisher
: The MIT Press.,
Collation
1 online resource (xii, 360 pages) :illustrations, maps
Language
English
ISBN/ISSN
0262333627
Classification
NONE
Content Type
text
Media Type
computer
Carrier Type
online resource
Edition
-
Subject(s)
Cognition.
Philosophy of mind.
Philosophy.
Paradigm (Theory of knowledge)
Specific Detail Info
-
Statement of Responsibility
Steven Horst.
Other Information
Cataloger
Angga
Source
-
Validator
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Digital Object Identifier (DOI)
https://direct.mit.edu/books/monograph/3480/Cognitive-Pluralism
Journal Volume
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Journal Issue
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Subtitle
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Parallel Title
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  • Cognitive Pluralism
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