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A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation

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The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list of examples of this phenomenon is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. This book looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective? The book brings together developments in both cooperative and non-cooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. It concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.

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Publisher

Oxford : Oxford University Press., 2007

Collation

336 hlm

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

9780191709104

Classification

NONE

Content Type

text

Media Type

computer

Carrier Type

online resource

Edition

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Subject(s)

ALGEBRA

Specific Detail Info

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Statement of Responsibility

Debraj Ray

Other Information

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Source

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Validator

Maya

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199207954.001.0001

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