Text

Chapter 10 Troubles with the Orthogonality Thesis

---

This chapter evaluates some basic assumptions behind the “dual” theories of phenomenal consciousness and finds them problematic for at least some examples of conscious episodes. Because the dual theories claim to be universalist in nature, even small number of counterexamples damages their status. I will present evidence, both empirical and conceptual, that demonstrates untenability of the dualist assumptions that conscious phenomenality and its unconscious counterpart possess essentially the same qualities. In doing so, I will primarily attack the claim that is shared by many dual theorists that the procedure responsible for bringing phenomenal content into consciousness serves this sole function and does not influence phenomenal qualities of content. I use the term orthogonality, first introduced in Vosgerau et al. (2008), as a convenient shortcut for the conception in which consciousness and content come unproblematically apart. I will conclude by hinting at an alternative proposal that explains emergence of conscious phenomenality as a single step operation.

---

Availability

No copy data

Detail Information

Series Title

-

Call Number

-

Publisher

: Taylor & Francis., 2024

Collation

-

Language

English

ISBN/ISSN

9781032529790, 9781032529745

Classification

NONE

Content Type

text

Media Type

computer

Carrier Type

online resource

Edition

1

Subject(s)

-

Specific Detail Info

-

Statement of Responsibility

-

Other Information

Cataloger

Hasan

Source

https://directory.doabooks.org/handle/20.500.12854/121634

Validator

-

Digital Object Identifier (DOI)

10.4324/ 9781003409526- 13

Journal Volume

-

Journal Issue

-

Subtitle

-

Parallel Title

-

Other version/related

File Attachment

Comments

---

You must be logged in to post a comment