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Found 5 from your keywords: subject="Content (Psychology)"
cover
Evolving enactivism :basic minds meet content
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Hutto, Daniel D.,Myin, Erik,

Evolving Enactivism" argues that cognitive phenomena - perceiving, imagining, remembering -- can be best explained in terms of an interface between contentless and content-involving forms of cognition. Building on their earlier book Radicalizing Enactivism, which proposes that there can be forms of cognition without content, Daniel Hutto and Erik Myin demonstrate the unique explanatory advantag…

Edition
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ISBN/ISSN
9780262339773
Collation
1 online resource (xxvi, 328 pages).
Series Title
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cover
The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics
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FODOR, Jerry A

"A Bradford book."OCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.

Edition
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ISBN/ISSN
0585020515
Collation
1 online resource (xii, 128 pages) :illustrations.
Series Title
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Call Number
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cover
Essays on Nonconceptual Content
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GUNTHER, York

"A Bradford book."According to the widespread conceptualist view, all mental contents are governed by concepts an individual possesses. In recent years, however, an increasing number of philosophers have argued for the indispensability of nonconceptual content based on perceptual, emotional, and qualitative experiences; informational and computational states; memory; and practical knowledge. Wr…

Edition
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ISBN/ISSN
9780262274524
Collation
1 online resource (339 pages)
Series Title
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Call Number
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cover
A Theory of Content and Other Essays
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Fodor, Jerry A.

A Bradford book."OCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.

Edition
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ISBN/ISSN
9780262287999
Collation
1 online resource (xii, 270 pages)
Series Title
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Call Number
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cover
Radicalizing Enactivism: Basic Minds without Content
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Hutto, Daniel D.Myin, Erik.

Hutto and Myin promote the cause of a radically enactive, embodied approach to cognition which holds that some kinds of minds - basic minds - are neither best explained by processes involving the manipulation of contents nor inherently contentful. It opposes the widely endorsed thesis that cognition always and everywhere involves content. The authors defend the counter-thesis that there can be …

Edition
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ISBN/ISSN
0262312174
Collation
1 online resource
Series Title
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Call Number
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