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Found 4 from your keywords: subject="Mind-brain identity t...
cover
Natural minds
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Polger, Thomas W.

"A Bradford book."In Natural Minds Thomas Polger advocates, and defends, the philosophical theory that mind equals brain--that sensations are brain processes--and in doing so brings the mind-brain identity theory back into the philosophical debate about consciousness. The version of identity theory that Polger advocates holds that conscious processes, events, states, or properties are type- ide…

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ISBN/ISSN
9780262281737
Collation
1 online resource (xxvii, 294 pages) :illustrations
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G?odel, Putnam, and functionalism :a new reading of Representation and reality
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Buechner, Jeff.

"A Bradford book."The first systematic examination of Hilary Putnam's arguments against computational functionalism challenges each of Putnam's main arguments.OCLC-licensed vendor bibliographic record.

Edition
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ISBN/ISSN
9780262269513
Collation
1 online resource (x, 344 pages)
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Neither brain nor ghost :a nondualist alternative to the mind-brain identity …
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Rockwell, W. Teed.

In this highly original work, Teed Rockwell rejects both dualism and the mind-brain identity theory. He proposes instead that mental phenomena emerge not merely from brain activity but from an interacting nexus of brain, body, and world. The mind can be seen not as an organ within the body, but as a "behavioral field" that fluctuates within this brain-body-world nexus. If we reject the dominant…

Edition
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ISBN/ISSN
0262681676
Collation
1 online resource (xxii, 231 pages) :illustrations
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Representation and reality
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Putnam, Hilary.

"A Bradford book."Hilary Putnam, who may have been the first philosopher to advance the notion that the computer is an apt model for the mind, takes a radically new view of his own theory of functionalism in this book. Putnam argues that in fact the computational analogy cannot answer the important questions about the nature of such mental states as belief, reasoning, rationality, and knowledge…

Edition
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ISBN/ISSN
0585021228
Collation
1 online resource (xv, 136 pages).
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